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Abstract. Secure equilibrium is a refinement of Nash equilibrium, which
provides some security to the players against deviations when a player
changes his strategy to another best response strategy. The concept of
secure equilibrium is specifically developed for assume-guarantee synthe-
sis and has already been applied in this context. Yet, not much is known
about its existence in games with more than two players. In this paper,
we establish the existence of secure equilibrium in two classes of multi-
player perfect information turn-based games: (1) in games with possibly
probabilistic transitions, having countable state and finite action spaces
and bounded and continuous payoff functions, and (2) in games with
only deterministic transitions, having arbitrary state and action spaces
and Borel payoff functions with a finite range (in particular, qualitative
Borel payoff functions). We show that these results apply to several types
of games studied in the literature.
1 Introduction
The game:We examine multi-player perfect information turn-based games with
possibly probabilistic transitions. In such a game, each state is associated with
a player, who controls this state. Play of the game starts at the initial state. At
every state that play visits, the player who controls this state has to choose an
action from a given action space. Next, play moves to a new state according to
a probability measure, which may depend on the current state and the chosen
action. This induces an infinite sequence of states and actions, and depending
on this play, each player receives a payoff.
These payoffs are fairly general. For example, they could arise as some ag-
gregation of instantaneous rewards that the players receive at the periods of the
game. A frequently used aggregation would be taking the discounted sum of the
instantaneous rewards. Another special case arises if the payoffs only depend
on the first T periods, which essentially results in a game of horizon T . Or as
another example, the payoffs could represent reachability conditions, and then
a player’s payoff would be either 1 or 0 depending on whether a certain set of
states is reached.
Two-player zero-sum games with possibly probabilistic transitions have been
applied in the model-checking of reactive systems where randomness occurs,
because they allow to model the interactions between a system and its envi-
ronment. However, complex systems are usually made up of several components
with objectives that are not necessarily antagonist, that is why multi-player non
zero-sum games are better suited in such cases.
Nash equilibrium: In these games, Nash equilibrium is a prominent solution
concept. A Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile such that no player can improve
his payoff by individually deviating to another strategy. In various classes of
perfect information games, a Nash equilibrium is known to exist (cf. for example
[9,10] or the result of Mertens and Neyman in [13]).
Secure equilibrium: Despite the obvious appeal of Nash equilibrium, certain
applications call for additional properties. Chatterjee et al [5] introduced the con-
cept of secure equilibrium, which they specifically designed for assume-guarantee
synthesis. They gave a definition of secure equilibrium ([5, Definition 8]) in qual-
itative n-player games4, and then a characterization ([5, Proposition 4]), which
however turns out not to be equivalent. With their definition, such kind of equi-
libirum may fail to exist even in very simple games (cf. Remark 1 or [7, Example
2.2.34]). That is why we choose to call a strongly secure equilibrium an equilib-
rium according to [5, Definition 8] (see Remark 1), and we choose to call, as it
has already been done in [1,2], a secure equilibrium an equilibrium according to
the alternative characterization given in [5, Proposition 4], extended to the quan-
titative framework. Note that, with these definitions, every secure equilibrium
is automatically strongly secure if there are only two players.
Thus, a strategy profile is called a secure equilibrium if it is a Nash equi-
librium and moreover the following security property holds: if any player indi-
vidually deviates to another best response strategy, then it cannot be the case
that all opponents are weakly worse off due to this deviation and at least one
opponent is even strictly hurt. For applications of secure equilibrium, we refer
to [5,4,6].
Only little is known about the existence of secure equilibrium. To our knowl-
edge, the available existence results are for games with only two players5 and
for only deterministic transitions, i.e. every action in every state leads to a cer-
tain state with probability 1. Chatterjee et al [5] proved the existence of a secure
equilibrium in two-player games in which the payoff function of each player is the
indicator function of a Borel subset of plays. Recently, the existence of a secure
equilibrium, even a subgame-perfect secure equilibrium, has been shown [2] in
two-player games in which each player’s goal is to reach a certain set of states as
quickly as possible and his payoff is determined by the number of moves it takes
4 Note that Chatterjee et al [5] gave no existence result in the n-player case.
5 However, Chatterjee and Henzinger [4] proved the existence of secure equilibria in
the special case of 3-player qualitative games where the third player can win uncon-
ditionally.
to get there. Very recently, the existence of a secure equilibrium has been proved
[3] in a class of two-player quantitative games which includes payoff functions
like sup, inf, lim sup, lim inf, mean-payoff, and discounted sum.
Our contribution: In this paper, we address the existence problem of secure
equilibrium for multi-player perfect information games. We establish the exis-
tence of secure equilibrium in two classes of such games. First, when probabilistic
transitions are allowed6, we prove that a secure equilibrium exists, provided that
the state space is countable, the action spaces are finite, and the payoff func-
tions are bounded and continuous. To our knowledge, it is the first existence
result of secure equilibria in multi-player quantitative games. Moreover, our re-
sult extends to lexicographic preferences (see Section 6). Second, for games with
only deterministic transitions, we prove that a secure equilibrium exists if the
payoff functions are Borel measurable and have a finite range (in particular, for
Borel qualitative objectives). For the latter result, we impose no restriction on
the state and action spaces. We demonstrate that these results apply to several
classes of games studied in the literature. Regarding proof techniques, the proof
of the first result relies on an inductive procedure that eliminates certain actions
of the game, while the proof of the second result exploits a transformation of
the payoffs.
Structure of the paper: Section 2 is dedicated to the model. In Section 3
we present the main results and mention some classes of games to which the
results apply. Sections 4 and 5 contain the formal proofs of the results. Finally,
Section 6 concludes with some remarks and an algorithmic result for quantitative
reachability objectives.
2 The Model
We distinguish two types of perfect information games. The first type of games
may contain transition probabilities between 0 and 1, whereas the second type
only has deterministic transitions.
2.1 Games with Probabilistic Transitions
A multi-player perfect information game with possibly probabilistic transitions
is given by:
1. A finite set of players N , with |N | ≥ 2.
2. A countable state space S, containing an initial state s˜.
3. A controlling player i(s) ∈ N for every state s ∈ S.
4. A nonempty and finite action space A(s) for every state s ∈ S.
5. A probability measure q(s, a) for every state s ∈ S and action a ∈ A(s),
which assigns, to every z ∈ S(s, a) (the set of possible successor states when
choosing action a in state s), the probability q(s, a)(z) of transition from
state s to state z under action a.
6 Such games are also called turn-based multi-player stochastic games.
Let N = {0, 1, 2, . . .}. LetH be the set of all sequences of the form (s0, a0, . . . ,
sn−1, an−1, sn), where n ∈ N, such that s0 = s˜, and am ∈ A(sm) and sm+1 ∈
S(sm, am) for all m = 0, 1, . . . , n−1. Let P be the set of all infinite sequences
of the form (sm, am)m∈N such that s
0 = s˜, and am ∈ A(sm) and sm+1 ∈
S(sm, am) for all m ∈ N. The elements of H are called histories and the
elements of P are called plays. A history h is called a prefix of a play p,
denoted by h ≺ p, if p starts with h. We endow P with the topology induced
by the cylinder sets C(h) = {p ∈ P|h ≺ p} for h ∈ H. In this topology, a
sequence of plays (pm)m∈N converges to a play p precisely when for every
k ∈ N there exists an Nk ∈ N such that pm coincides with p on the first k
coordinates for every m ≥ Nk.
6. A payoff function ui : P → R for every player i ∈ N , which is bounded and
Borel measurable.
The game is played as follows at periods in N = {0, 1, 2, . . .}. Play starts at
period 0 in state s0 = s˜, where the controlling player i(s0) chooses an action
a0 from A(s0). Then, transition occurs according to the probability measure
q(s0, a0) to a state s1. At period 1, the controlling player i(s1) chooses an action
a1 from A(s1). Then, transition occurs according to the probability measure
q(s1, a1) to a state s2, and so on. The realization of this process is a play p =
(s0, a0, s1, a1, s2, . . .), and each player i ∈ N receives payoff ui(p).
We can assume without loss of generality that the sets S(s, a), for s ∈ S and
a ∈ A(s), are mutually disjoint, and their union is S. This means that each state
can be visited in exactly one way from the initial state s˜, so there is a bijection
between states and histories. For this reason, we will work with states instead
of histories.
Strategies: For every player i ∈ N , let Si denote the set of those states (his-
tories) which are controlled by him. A strategy for a player i ∈ N is a function
σi that assigns an action σi(s) ∈ A(s) to every state s ∈ Si. The interpretation
is that σi(s) is the recommended action if state s is reached. A strategy profile
is a tuple (σ1, . . . , σ|N |) where σi is a strategy for every player i ∈ N . Given a
strategy profile σ = (σ1, . . . , σ|N |) and a player i, we denote by σ−i the profile
of strategies of player i’s opponents, i.e. σ−i = (σj)j∈N, j 6=i.
A strategy profile σ induces a unique probability measure on the sigma-
algebra of the Borel sets of P . The corresponding expected payoff for player
i ∈ N is denoted by ui(σ).
Nash equilibrium: A strategy profile σ∗ is called a Nash equilibrium, if no
player can improve his expected payoff by a unilateral deviation, i.e. ui(τi, σ
∗
−i) ≤
ui(σ
∗) for every player i ∈ N and every strategy τi for player i. In other words,
every player plays a best response to the strategies of his opponents.
Secure equilibrium: A strategy profile σ∗ is called a secure equilibrium, if it
is a Nash equilibrium and if, additionally, no player i ∈ N has a strategy τi
with ui(τi, σ
∗
−i) = ui(σ
∗) such that we have for all players j ∈ N \ {i} that
uj(τi, σ
∗
−i) ≤ uj(σ
∗) and for some player k ∈ N \ {i} that uk(τi, σ
∗
−i) < uk(σ
∗).
The interpretation of the additional property is the following. Consider a
Nash equilibrium σ∗ and a strategy τi for some player i. By deviating to τi,
player i either receives a worse expected payoff than with his original strategy
σ∗i , or the same expected payoff at best. In the former case, it is not in player
i’s interest to deviate to τi. In the latter case, however, even though player i is
indifferent, his opponents could get hurt. The property thus prevents the case
that this deviation is weakly worse for all opponents of player i, and that this
deviation is even hurting a player. So, in a certain sense, player is opponents are
secure against such deviations by player i.
An equivalent formulation of secure equilibrium is the following: a strategy
profile σ∗ is called a secure equilibrium, if it is a Nash equilibrium and if, addi-
tionally, the following property holds for every player i ∈ N : if τi is a strategy for
player i such that ui(τi, σ
∗
−i) = ui(σ
∗) and uj(τi, σ
∗
−i) < uj(σ
∗) for some player
j ∈ N , then there is a player k ∈ N such that uk(τi, σ
∗
−i) > uk(σ
∗).
Remark 1. There is a refinement of secure equilibrium, which plays an important
role in the proofs of our main results, Theorems 1 and 2. We call a strategy profile
σ∗ a sum-secure equilibrium, if it is a Nash equilibrium and if additionally the
following property holds for every player i ∈ N : if τi is a strategy for player i
such that ui(τi, σ
∗
−i) = ui(σ
∗) then
∑
j∈N\{i} uj(τi, σ
∗
−i) ≥
∑
j∈N\{i} uj(σ
∗). In
fact, in Theorems 1 and 2, we prove the existence of sum-secure equilibria.
An even stronger concept is the following. A strategy profile σ∗ is called
a strongly secure equilibrium, if it is a Nash equilibrium and if additionally the
following property holds for every player i ∈ N : if τi is a strategy for player i such
that ui(τi, σ
∗
−i) = ui(σ
∗) then uj(τi, σ
∗
−i) ≥ uj(σ
∗) for all players j 6= i. Note that
every secure equilibrium is also strongly secure if there are only two players. The
concept of strongly secure equilibrium has the serious drawback though that it
fails to exist even in very simple games [7, Example 2.2.34]. Indeed, consider the
following game with three players. Player 1 has two actions, such that the first
action yields payoffs (1, 2, 0), whereas the second action yields payoffs (1, 0, 2).
Players 2 and 3 never become active in this game. Now either action of player 1
yields a secure equilibrium, but neither of them is strongly secure.
2.2 Games with Deterministic Transitions
Another type of perfect information games arises when the game has only de-
terministic transitions, i.e. when the set S(s, a) is a singleton for every state
s ∈ S and every action a ∈ A(s). In this case, we do not need to take care of
measurability conditions for the calculation of expected payoffs. Hence, we can
drop the assumptions that the state space is countable and the action spaces are
finite, and they can be arbitrary.
3 The Main Results
In this section, we present and discuss our main results for the existence of secure
equilibrium. First we examine the case of probabilistic transitions.
Theorem 1. Take a perfect information game, possibly having probabilistic tran-
sitions, with countable state and finite action spaces. If every player’s payoff
function is bounded and continuous7, then the game admits a secure equilibrium.
Let us first elaborate on the conditions of Theorem 1. By assuming that
the state space is countable, we avoid measure theoretic complications. Without
the assumptions that the action spaces are finite and the payoff functions are
continuous, even a Nash equilibrium may fail to exist. This is shown by the
following two examples.
Example 1. Consider the following one shot game (each finite duration game can
be seen as an infinite duration game): a player can choose any positive integer,
and if he chooses k then his payoff is 1 − 1
k
. The payoff function is continuous,
but the action space is infinite. Clearly, the game admits no Nash equilibrium.
Example 2. Suppose that a player can decide every day whether to stop or to
continue. If he stops at period n, then his payoff is 1 − 1
n
, whereas if he never
stops then he receives payoff 0. Here, the action space is finite, but the payoff
function is not continuous. This game has no Nash equilibrium.
For games with only deterministic transitions, we also obtain the following
result, which imposes a condition on the range of the payoff functions.
Theorem 2. Take a perfect information game with deterministic transitions,
with arbitrary state and action spaces. If every player’s payoff function is Borel
measurable and has a finite range, then the game admits a secure equilibrium.
Theorem 2 assumes that the range of the payoff functions is finite. This
assumption is only useful for deterministic transitions, otherwise the range of
the expected payoffs may become infinite. Without this assumption, even a Nash
equilibrium can fail to exist, as Example 1 above shows.
The methods of proving Theorems 1 and 2 are really different. The proof
of Theorem 1 uses an inductive procedure that eliminates certain actions in
certain states. This procedure terminates with a game, in which one can identify
an interesting strategy profile that can be enhanced with punishment strategies
to be a secure equilibrium in the original game. The proof of Theorem 2 relies
on a transformation of the payoffs. In the new game, a Nash equilibrium exists,
and it is a secure equilibrium of the original game.
The above two theorems apply to various classes of games that have been
studied in the literature. We now mention a number of them. We only discuss
the assumptions imposed on the payoff functions, as it is clear when a game
satisfies the rest of the assumptions:
1. In games with a finite horizon, the payoff functions are continuous, so The-
orem 1 is applicable to such games if the other hypotheses are satisfied. The
same observation holds for discounted games, where the players aggregate
instantaneous payoffs by taking the discounted sum.
7 Notice that any continuous function is Borel measurable.
2. All qualitative payoff functions have a finite range, so Theorem 2 directly
implies the existence of a secure equilibrium in multi-player games played
on a graph with deterministic transitions and qualitative Borel objectives (in
particular, objectives like reachability, safety, (co–)Bu¨chi, parity,. . . ).
3. Now consider a game played on a graph with quantitative payoff functions.
For quantitative reachability objectives, by [2, Remark 2.5], we can use Theo-
rem 1 to find a secure equilibrium as long as the transitions are deterministic
(the transformation drastically changes expected payoffs). For quantitative
safety objectives, continuous payoff functions can also be defined: if Fi ⊆ S
is the safety set of player i, let ui(p) = 1 −
1
n+1 for any play p if, along p,
the set S \ Fi is reached at period n for the first time and let ui(p) = 1 if
S \ Fi is never reached along p. And in a similar way for quantitative Bu¨chi
objectives : if Bi ⊆ S is the Bu¨chi set of player i, let M(p) denote, for any
play p, the set of periods at which the play p is in a state in Bi. Then, define
ui(p) =
∑
k∈M(p)
1
2k
.
4. Theorem 2 implies the existence of a secure equilibrium in games played
on finite weighted8 graphs with deterministic transitions, where the payoff
functions are computed as the sup, inf, lim sup or lim inf of the weights
appearing along plays (as in [3]). Indeed, these functions have finite range
in such games.
4 The proof of Theorem 1
In this section, we provide a formal proof of Theorem 1. Consider a perfect
information game G, having possibly probabilistic transitions, with a countable
state and finite action spaces. Assume that the payoff function of every player
is bounded and continuous.
4.1 Preliminaries
In this subsection, we keep the game G fixed. We introduce some notation, define
some preliminary notions and state some properties of them.
For every player i ∈ N , we use the notation Σi for the set of strategies
of player i, so Σi = ×s∈SiA(s). We endow Σi with the product topology Ti.
Since the set Si is countable and the action spaces are finite, the topological
space (Σi, Ti) is compact and metrizable. Hence, the set of strategy profiles
Σ = ×i∈NΣi, endowed with the product topology T = ×i∈NTi, is also com-
pact and metrizable. So, these spaces are sequentially compact, meaning that
every sequence in them has a convergent subsequence. This is one of the main
consequences of assuming that the action spaces are finite.
We assumed that the payoffs are continuous on the set of plays. The next
lemma states that the expected payoffs are continuous as well.
8 Each edge of the graph is labelled by a |N |-tuple of real values.
Lemma 1. For any player i ∈ N , the expected payoff function ui : Σ → R is
continuous.
Proof. Since Σ, endowed with the topology T , is metrizable, it suffices to show
that if a sequence (σn)n∈N of strategy profiles converges to a strategy profile σ,
then ui(σ
n) converges to ui(σ). So, take a sequence (σ
n)n∈N of strategy profiles
converging to some σ. Let Pσn denote the probability measure induced by σ
n on
the set of plays P , and let Pσ be the one induced by σ.
Consider an arbitrary cylinder set C(s) of P . Because every state can be
reached in exactly one way from the initial state s˜, it follows that Pσn(C(s))
converges to Pσ(C(s)). Now take an open set O of P . Notice that O can be
written as a disjoint union of cylinder sets of P . Since there are only countably
many cylinder sets, we find that lim infn→∞ Pσn(O) ≥ Pσ(O). This means that
the probability measures Pσn converge weakly to Pσ. Hence, because ui : P →
R is assumed to be bounded and continuous, ui(σ
n) = Eσn(ui) converges to
ui(σ) = Eσ(ui), where E refers to the expectation. ⊓⊔
Given a state s ∈ S, we define the subgame G(s) as the game that arises
when state s is reached (i.e. past play has followed the unique history from the
initial state s˜ to s). Every strategy profile σ induces a strategy profile in G(s),
as well as an expected payoff for every player i, which we denote by ui(σ|s).
For every player i ∈ N , we derive a zero-sum perfect information game Gi
from G by making the following modification. There are two players: player i
and an imaginary player −i, who replaces the set of opponents N \ {i} of player
i. So, whenever a state is reached controlled by a player from N \ {i}, player
−i can choose the action. Player i tries to maximize his expected payoff given
by ui, whereas player −i tries to minimize this expected payoff, so u−i = −ui.
We say that this zero-sum game Gi has a value, denoted by vi, if player i has
a strategy σ∗i and his opponents have a strategy profile σ
∗
−i, which is thus a
strategy for player−i, such that ui(σ
∗
i , τ−i) ≥ vi for every strategy profile τ−i and
ui(τi, σ
∗
−i) ≤ vi for every strategy τi for player i. This means that σ
∗
i guarantees
for player i that he receives an expected payoff of at least vi, and σ
∗
−i guarantees
that player i does not receive an expected payoff of more than vi. We call the
strategy σ∗i optimal for player i and the strategy profile σ
∗
−i optimal for player i’s
opponents. Note that (σ∗i , σ
∗
−i) forms a Nash equilibrium in Gi, and vice versa,
if (τi, τ−i) is a Nash equilibrium in Gi, then τi and τ−i are optimal. In a similar
way, we can also speak of the value of the subgame Gi(s) of Gi, for a state s ∈ S,
which we denote by vi(s).
The next lemma states that, for every player i ∈ N and state s ∈ S, the game
Gi(s) admits a value. Moreover, one can find a strategy for player i that induces
an optimal strategy in every gameGi(s), for s ∈ S, and player i’s opponents have
a similar strategy profile. This follows from the existence of a subgame-perfect
Nash equilibrium in our setting (where subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium refers
to a strategy profile that induces a Nash equilibrium in every subgame), see [11,
Theorem 1.2]. It is also an easy extension of [9, Corollary 4.2], with almost the
same proof (based on approximations of the game by finite horizon truncations).
Lemma 2. Take a player i ∈ N . The value vi(s) of the game Gi(s) exists for
every state s ∈ S. Moreover, player i has a strategy σ∗i such that σ
∗
i induces
an optimal strategy in the subgame Gi(s), for every state s ∈ S. Similarly, the
opponents of player i have a strategy profile σ∗−i such that σ
∗
−i induces an optimal
strategy profile in the subgame Gi(s), for every state s ∈ S.
For every player i ∈ N , every state s ∈ S and every action a ∈ A(s), define
vi(s, a) =
∑
z∈S
q(s, a)(z) · vi(z).
This is in expectation the value for player i in the subgame of G that arises if
player i(s) chooses action a in state s. Obviously, for the controlling player i(s)
we have
vi(s)(s) = max
a∈A(s)
vi(s)(s, a). (1)
Here, the maximum is attained due to the finiteness of A(s). Let us call an action
a ∈ A(s) optimal in state s if vi(s)(s) = vi(s)(s, a). We also have for every player
j ∈ N \ {i(s)} that
vj(s) = min
a∈A(s)
vj(s, a). (2)
4.2 A Procedure to Derive a Restricted Game with Only Optimal
Actions
In this subsection, we define a procedure that inductively eliminates all actions
that are not optimal and terminates with a specific gameG∞, in which all actions
are optimal.
Take a nonempty set A′(s) ⊆ A(s) for every state s ∈ S. The sets A′(s), for
s ∈ S, induce a game G′ that we derive from G as follows: the set of states S′ of
G′ consists of those states z ∈ S for which the unique history that starts at s˜ and
ends at z only uses actions in the sets A′(s), for s ∈ S. These are the states that
a play can visit, with possibly probability zero, when the actions are restricted
to the sets A′(s), for s ∈ S. The action space of G′ in every state s ∈ S′ is then
A′(s). Further, the payoff functions of G′ are obtained by restricting the payoff
functions of G to plays corresponding to these new state and action spaces.
Let G0 be the game G, let S0 = S and let A0(s) = A(s) for every s ∈ S.
Then, at every state s ∈ S, we delete all actions that are not optimal. This
results in a nonempty action space A1(s) ⊆ A0(s) for every state s ∈ S. Let G1
denote the induced game, with state space S1. In the next step, at every state
s ∈ S1, we delete all actions from A1(s) that are not optimal in G1. This gives a
nonempty action space A2(s) ⊆ A1(s) for every state s ∈ S1. Let G2 denote the
induced game, with state space S2. By proceeding this way, we obtain for every
k ∈ N a game Gk with state space Sk and nonempty action spaces Ak(s), for
s ∈ Sk. Finally, let S∞ = ∩k∈NS
k and A∞(s) = ∩k∈NA
k(s) for every s ∈ S∞.
Note that the initial state s˜ belongs to S∞, and also that, due to the finiteness
of the action spaces, the sets A∞(s), for s ∈ S∞, are nonempty. Let G∞ be the
game induced by the sets A∞(s), for s ∈ S∞. It is clear that the state space of
G∞ is exactly S∞.
We now define a function φ : S → N ∪ {∞}. Note that every state s ∈ S
belongs either to Sk \ Sk+1 for a unique k ∈ N or to S∞. In the former case, we
define φ(s) = k, whereas in the latter case we define φ(s) = ∞. So, this is the
latest iteration in which state s is still included. For notational convenience, we
extend the strategy space of player i in Gk, for k ∈ N ∪ {∞}, with strategies σi
for player i in G with the following property: for every s ∈ S, if φ(s) ≥ k then
σi(s) ∈ A
k(s), whereas if φ(s) < k then σi(s) is an arbitrary action in A
φ(s)(s).
By doing so, every strategy in Gk is also a strategy in Gm if m ≤ k.
Now we consider the subgames of the above defined games. For every k ∈
N ∪ {∞} and player i ∈ N , by Lemma 2, the game Gki (s) has a value v
k
i (s) for
every s ∈ S. Moreover, player i has a strategy σki such that σ
k
i induces an optimal
strategy in the subgame Gki (s) for every state s ∈ S
k. Similarly, the opponents
of player i have a strategy profile σk−i such that σ
k
−i induces an optimal strategy
profile in the subgame Gki (s) for every state s ∈ S
k. Note that σki can only use
optimal actions in Gk, so by construction, σki is also a strategy for player i in
the game Gk+1.
Lemma 3. We have vki (s) ≤ v
k+1
i (s) for every k ∈ N, player i ∈ N , and state
s ∈ Sk+1.
Proof. Take a k ∈ N, a player i ∈ N , and a state s ∈ Sk+1. Let τ−i be an
arbitrary strategy profile for player i’s opponents in the game Gk+1. Hence, τ−i
is also a strategy profile for them in the game Gk. Therefore, by the optimality
of σki in G
k
i (s), we have ui(σ
k
i , τ−i|s) ≥ v
k
i (s). Because σ
k
i is also a strategy for
player i in the game Gk+1, it means that player i can guarantee at least vki (s)
in the game Gk+1(s). Therefore vki (s) ≤ v
k+1
i (s), as desired. ⊓⊔
Lemma 4. We have limk→∞ v
k
i (s) = v
∞
i (s) for every player i ∈ N and state
s ∈ S∞.
Proof. Take a k ∈ N, a player i ∈ N , and a state s ∈ S∞. By Lemma 3 and the
boundedness of the payoffs, the sequence (vki (s))k∈N converges to some r ∈ R.
We need to show that r = v∞i (s).
Consider the sequences (σki )k∈N and (σ
k
−i)k∈N. Since the strategy spaces
in G are sequentially compact, these sequences have convergent subsequences
(σki )k∈M and (σ
k
−i)k∈M , for some infinite subset M ⊆ N. Let σi and σ−i de-
note the limit strategies. It follows by construction that σi is a strategy and
respectively σ−i is a strategy profile in the game G
∞.
Let τ−i be an arbitrary strategy profile for player i’s opponents in the game
G∞. Then, τ−i is also a strategy profile in the game G
m, for any m ∈ M . By
the optimality of σmi in G
m(s), we find ui(σ
m
i , τ−i|s) ≥ v
m
i (s) for all m ∈ M .
If we take the limit when m tends to infinity in the set M , Lemma 1 yields
ui(σi, τ−i|s) ≥ r. Since σi is a strategy in G
∞, we have v∞i (s) ≥ r. It can be
shown similarly, by using the strategy profile σ−i, that v
∞
i (s) ≤ r. The proof is
complete. ⊓⊔
The next lemma shows that there is no need to continue the elimination
procedure in a transfinite way.
Lemma 5. Every action is optimal in the game G∞, i.e. for every state s ∈ S∞
and action a ∈ A∞(s), we have for the controlling player i(s) that v∞i(s)(s) =
v∞
i(s)(s, a). Moreover, if τ is a strategy profile in the game G
∞, then ui(τ |s) ≥
v∞i (s) for every player i ∈ N and every state s ∈ S
∞.
Proof. Take a state s ∈ S∞ and an action a ∈ A∞(s). Then, a ∈ Ak(s) for all
k ∈ N, and therefore vk
i(s)(s) = v
k
i(s)(s, a) for all k ∈ N. By Lemma 4, we obtain
v∞
i(s)(s) = v
∞
i(s)(s, a), so the first part of the lemma follows.
Now take a strategy profile τ in the game G∞, a player i, and a state s ∈ S∞.
Assume that state s can be reached at period n starting from the initial state s˜.
For m > n, let τm be the strategy profile that prescribes to play as follows: (1)
at periods 0, 1, . . . , n− 1, arbitrary actions can be chosen in G∞, (2) at periods
n, n + 1, . . . ,m − 1, the players follow τ , (3) at periods m,m + 1, . . ., player i
follows the strategy σ∞i and all other players follow their strategies in τ−i. Let s
ℓ
denote the random variable for the state at period ℓ ∈ N according to τm. By the
first part of the lemma and by Equality (2), we obtain that Eτm {v
∞
i (s
ℓ)|sn = s}
is non-decreasing for ℓ ∈ {n, n+ 1, . . . ,m}. Hence,
ui(τ
m|s) =
∑
z∈S∞
Pτm {s
m = z | sn = s} · ui(σ
∞
i , τ−i|z)
≥
∑
z∈S∞
Pτm {s
m = z | sn = s} · v∞i (z)
= Eτm {v
∞
i (s
m) | sn = s} ≥ v∞i (s).
As the strategy profile τm converges to τ as m tends to infinity from state s, by
Lemma 1 we obtain ui(τ |s) ≥ v
∞
i (s), as desired. ⊓⊔
4.3 The Secure Equilibrium
Now we argue that thanks to the properties of this new game G∞, we are able to
identify an interesting strategy profile in this game, which can be enhanced with
punishment strategies in order to become a secure equilibrium in the original
game G.
Recall that σ−i and respectively σ
∞
−i are strategy profiles for player i’s oppo-
nents in G and respectively in G∞, such that they induce an optimal strategy
profile in Gi(s) and respectively G
∞
i (s
′), for every state s ∈ S and every state
s′ ∈ S∞. For each player j ∈ N \{i}, let σ−i,j and respectively σ
∞
−i,j be player j’s
strategy in these strategy profiles. These strategies will play the role of punishing
player i if player i deviates.
Let ρ∗ be a strategy profile in G∞ which minimizes the sum of the ex-
pected payoffs of all the players, i.e. for any strategy profile ρ in G∞ we have∑
i∈N ui(ρ
∗) ≤
∑
i∈N ui(ρ). Such a strategy profile exists due to the compact-
ness of the set of strategy profiles in G∞ and due to Lemma 1. The idea is to
define a secure equilibrium in G in the following way: follow ρ∗, unless a devia-
tion occurs. If player i deviates, then his opponents should punish player i with
σ∞−i as long as he chooses actions in G
∞, and they should punish him with σ−i
as soon as he chooses an action out of G∞. Let us specify this strategy profile
more precisely.
We first define a function L, which assigns to each state the player who has
to be punished from this state, or ⊥ if nobody has to be punished. The idea
here is to remember the first player who deviated from the strategy profile ρ∗.
For the initial state s˜, we have L(s˜) = ⊥. For other states, we define it by
induction. Suppose that we have defined L(s) for some state s ∈ S. Then, for a
state s′ ∈ S(s, a), where a ∈ A(s), we set:
L(s′) :=


⊥ if L(s) = ⊥ and ρ∗
i(s)(s) = a,
i(s) if L(s) = ⊥ and ρ∗
i(s)(s) ∈ A(s) \ {a},
L(s) otherwise (i.e. when L(s) 6= ⊥).
Now we define a strategy τj for every player j ∈ N as follows: for every state
s ∈ Sj let
τj(s) :=


ρ∗j (s) if L(s) = ⊥,
arbitrary action in A∞(s) if L(s) = j and s ∈ S∞,
arbitrary action in A(s) if L(s) = j and s ∈ S \ S∞,
σ∞−i,j(s) if L(s) = i 6= j and s ∈ S
∞,
σ−i,j(s) if L(s) = i 6= j and s ∈ S \ S
∞.
We will show that τ = (τj)j∈N is a secure equilibrium in G. We remark that
in the second case, when L(s) = j and s ∈ S∞, it is not necessary to have any
restriction on the action τj(s), and we only require τj(s) ∈ A
∞(s) because it
simplifies the arguments of the proof.
Consider a strategy τ ′i for player i. The following lemma says that, in any
state s ∈ S∞, it is strictly worse for player i to deviate to an action outside
A∞(s), unless another player deviated before him (that case is irrelevant for our
goal to show that τ is a secure equilibrium).
Lemma 6. For each state s ∈ S∞i such that L(s) ∈ {⊥, i} and τ
′
i(s) ∈ A(s) \
A∞(s), we have ui(τ
′
i , τ−i|s) < ui(τ |s).
Proof. Suppose the opposite, and let a = τ ′i(s). Then, there is a k ∈ N such that
a ∈ Ak(s) \Ak+1(s). In particular, vki (s) > v
k
i (s, a). Moreover, because L(z) = i
and z ∈ S \ S∞ for every state z ∈ S(s, a), the strategy profile τ−i tells player
i’s opponents to follow σ−i from every state z ∈ S(s, a). Hence, by Lemmas 3
and 4
ui(τ
′
i , τ−i|s) =
∑
z∈S(s,a)
q(s, a)(z) · ui(τ
′
i , σ−i|z) ≤
∑
z∈S(s,a)
q(s, a)(z) · vi(z)
= vi(s, a) ≤ v
k
i (s, a) < v
k
i (s) ≤ v
∞
i (s).
Notice that v∞i (s) ≤ ui(τ |s). Indeed, if L(s) = ⊥ then ui(τ |s) = ui(ρ
∗|s) ≥
v∞i (s) by Lemma 5. Now, if L(s) = i, then when playing according to τ the
following properties hold in the subgame G(s): only states in S∞ are visited,
player i plays the action τi(s
′) ∈ A∞(s′) in all states s′ ∈ S∞i that are reached
after s, and player i’s opponents follow σ∞−i. Hence, in the subgame G(s), the
strategy profile τ does not leave G∞ when it is played, so by Lemma 5, we obtain
again that ui(τ |s) ≥ v
∞
i (s).
By combining the above, we find ui(τ
′
i , τ−i|s) < v
∞
i (s) ≤ ui(τ |s), as desired.
⊓⊔
With the help of the above lemma, we can handle deviations to actions
outside G∞. The next lemma is about deviations to actions inside G∞. It claims
that player i does not get a better payoff if he deviates to an action inside the
game G∞, given no deviation has occurred before.
Lemma 7. For each state s ∈ S∞i such that L(s) = ⊥ and τ
′
i(s) ∈ A
∞(s) \
{ρ∗i (s)}, we have ui(τ
′
i , τ−i|s) ≤ ui(τ |s).
Proof. Suppose that state s ∈ S∞i is such that L(s) = ⊥ and τ
′
i(s) ∈ A
∞(s) \
{ρ∗i (s)}.
Let Z denote the set of states z ∈ S∞i such that (1) L(z) ∈ {⊥, i} and
τ ′i(z) ∈ A(z) \ A
∞(z), and (2) z is minimal with property (1) in the sense that
there is no state z′ 6= z on the unique path from the initial state s˜ to z with
property (1). Let µi be the strategy for player i as follows: µi coincides with τ
′
i as
long as no state in Z is reached, and as soon as a state z ∈ Z is reached, µi follows
τi in the subgameG(z). In view of Lemma 6, we have ui(τ
′
i , τ−i|s) ≤ ui(µi, τ−i|s).
Therefore, it suffices to show that ui(µi, τ−i|s) ≤ ui(τ |s).
Since L(s) = ⊥, no state in Z is visited on the unique path from the initial
state s˜ to s. Hence, τ ′i(s) = µi(s). Let a denote this action. Then, for any state
w ∈ S(s, a), we have L(w) = i and w ∈ S∞. So, when playing according to
(µi, τ−i) the following properties hold in the subgame G(s): only states in S
∞
are visited, player i’s action µi(s
′) belongs to A∞(s′) in all states s′ ∈ S∞i that
are reached after s, and player i’s opponents follow σ∞−i. Hence, in the subgame
G(s), the strategy profile (µi, τ−i) does not leave G
∞ when it is played, so by
the definition of σ∞−i, we obtain that ui(µi, τ−i|s) ≤ v
∞
i (s).
Since s ∈ S∞, we have ui(τ |s) ≥ v
∞
i (s) by Lemma 5. Therefore, ui(µi, τ−i|s) ≤
v∞i (s) ≤ ui(τ |s), as desired. ⊓⊔
Now we prove that τ is a secure equilibrium. It follows easily from Lemmas 6
and 7 that ui(τ
′
i , τ−i) ≤ ui(τ). This means that τ is a Nash equilibrium.
Furthermore, consider the case where ui(τ
′
i , τ−i) = ui(τ). Then, Lemma 6
implies that it has probability zero that a state s ∈ S∞i with τ
′
i(s) ∈ A(s)\A
∞(s)
is reached under (τ ′i , τ−i). Consequently, when playing according to (τ
′
i , τ−i) the
following properties hold in the game G: (1) only states in S∞ are visited, and
(2) in all states s ∈ S∞i that are reached, player i’s action τ
′
i(s) belongs to
A∞(s), and (3) in all states s ∈ S∞j , where j ∈ N \ {i}, that are reached,
player j plays the action given by ρ∗j (s) if L(s) = ⊥ and by σ
∞
−i,j(s) if L(s) = i.
Hence, the strategy profile (τ ′i , τ−i) does not leave G
∞ when it is played. As
ui(τ
′
i , τ−i) = ui(τ), the definition of ρ
∗ yields
∑
j∈N\{i}
uj(τ
′
i , τ−i) ≥
∑
j∈N\{i}
uj(ρ
∗) =
∑
j∈N\{i}
uj(τ).
Thus, τ is indeed a secure equilibrium in the game G, and the proof of Theorem 1
is complete.
5 The Proof of Theorem 2
In this section, we provide a proof for Theorem 2. Consider a perfect information
game G with deterministic transitions, with arbitrary state and action spaces.
Assume that the payoff functions are Borel measurable and have a finite range
M , i.e. every player i’s payoff function ui is only taking values in M . Assume
also that M contains at least two elements, otherwise the game is trivial.
Let R = maxm∈M |m| and d = minm,m′∈M,m 6=m′ |m −m
′|, and then choose
δ = d2|N |R . We denote by G
δ the game G with a new payoff function uδi for every
player i ∈ N , defined as follows: for every play p ∈ P , let
uδi (p) = ui(p)− δ ·
∑
j∈N, j 6=i
uj(p).
Notice that, for two plays p, p′ ∈ P , if we have ui(p) < ui(p
′) then
uδi (p
′)−uδi (p) = (ui(p
′)−ui(p))−δ·
∑
j∈N, j 6=i
(uj(p
′)−uj(p)) ≥ d−δ·(|N |−1)·2R > 0,
so uδi (p) < u
δ
i (p
′) holds too. Consequently, uδi (p) ≥ u
δ
i (p
′) implies ui(p) ≥ ui(p
′).
Now suppose that σ∗ is a Nash equilibrium in Gδ. Then, due to the previous
observation, σ∗ is also a Nash equilibrium in the original game G. Now we show
that σ∗ is a secure equilibrium in G. So, suppose that τi is a strategy for some
player i ∈ N such that ui(τi, σ
∗
−i) = ui(σ
∗). Since σ∗ is a Nash equilibrium in
Gδ, we also have uδi (τi, σ
∗
−i) ≤ u
δ
i (σ
∗). Hence
∑
j∈N, j 6=i
uj(τi, σ
∗
−i) ≥
∑
j∈N, j 6=i
uj(σ
∗),
which proves that σ∗ is a secure equilibrium in G indeed.
It remains to prove that Gδ admits a Nash equilibrium. We only provide a
sketch, since similar constructions are well known (cf. the result of Mertens and
Neyman in [13], and also [16]), and many of these ideas also appeared in the proof
of Theorem 1. The important property of Gδ is that the payoff functions uδi , for
i ∈ N , are Borel measurable and have a finite range. By applying a corollary of
Martin [12], for any i ∈ N , player i has a subgame-perfect optimal strategy σi
and his opponents have a subgame-perfect optimal strategy profile σ−i in the
zero-sum game Gi, in which player i maximizes u
δ
i and the other players are
jointly minimizing uδi . It can be checked easily that the following strategy profile
is a Nash equilibrium in Gδ: every player i should use the strategy σi. As soon
as a player deviates, say player i plays another action, then the other players
should punish player i in the remaining game by switching to the strategy profile
σ−i.
6 Concluding Remarks
Lexicographic objectives: In the proof of Theorem 1, we in fact showed the
existence of a sum-secure equilibrium (see Remark 1). A very similar proof can
be given to show that, if F : R|N | → R is a continuous and bounded function,
then there exists a Nash equilibrium σ∗ such that the following property holds
for every player i ∈ N : if τi is a strategy for player i such that ui(τi, σ
∗
−i) =
ui(σ
∗) then F (uj(σ
∗)j∈N ) ≤ F (uj(σi, σ
∗
−i)j∈N ). In fact, this is closely related to
lexicographic preferences: each player’s first objective is to maximize his payoff,
but in case of a tie between strategies, the secondary objective is to minimize
the function F .
Subgame-perfect secure equilibrium: Brihaye et al [2] introduced the con-
cept of subgame-perfect secure equilibrium, and showed its existence in two-
player quantitative reachability games. We do not know if Theorem 1 can be
extended to subgame-perfect secure equilibrium. Perhaps it is possible to make
use of the recently developed techniques for subgame-perfect equilibria in [8,14].
However, Theorem 2 cannot be extended to subgame-perfect secure equilib-
rium, as even a subgame-perfect equilibrium does not always exist in perfect
information games with deterministic transitions and finitely many payoffs, as
is shown by an example in [15].
Algorithmic result: Let us consider multi-player quantitative reachability games
played on a finite graph, with deterministic transitions, where each payoff is de-
termined by the number of moves it takes to get in a particular set of states. As a
corollary of Theorem 1 and some results of [2] (the proof of Theorem 4.1, Propo-
sition 4.5 and Remark 4.7), we derive an algorithm to obtain, in ExpSpace, a
secure equilibrium such that finite payoffs are bounded by 2 · |N | · |S| in such
games. We intend to further investigate algorithmic questions for other classes
of objectives.
Acknowledgment: We would like to thank Dario Bauso, Thomas Brihaye,
Ve´ronique Bruye`re and Guillaume Vigeral for valuable discussions on the concept
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